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Research Question
Does an increase in voter number falsify 
Duverger or Strategic Voting models developed in 
Game Theory or Experimental Voting?
Hypotheses and Results
• As voter number increases:
• Strategic Voting decreases, but behavior is still more 
strategic than randomness
• Duverger’s Law still holds
Vocabulary
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• Plurality Voting: an electoral system in which political goods are 
allocated based on which one receives the most votes
• Sincere Vote: a vote for a voter’s most preferred party
• Strategic Vote: a vote that for the party with a higher pivot probability, 
but is still preferred to the party with the next highest pivot probability. 
“Casting a vote that will count”
• Dominated Vote: a vote for the least favored party or for a party with 
which is both less favored and less likely to win.
• Misaligned vote: a Strategic, but Insincere vote
• Defection: Casting a strategic vote for a party other than the most 
preferred.  “Casting a misaligned Vote”
• Herindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) gives poll/vote concentration over 
parties. Mathematically it is the sum of the squared Vote shares. (e.g. 
if1 party receives all votes, HHI = 1^2 =1, if 2 parties each receive 50% 
of the votes than HHI = .5^2 +.5^2 = .5
• Duverger’s Law: Plurality Rule elections favor two party outcomes
Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI)
Gives the poll or vote concentration between the parties. Higher HHI means 
more concentrated poll or vote share, lower indicates a more evenly 
distributed poll or vote share among more parties
Poll and Vote Party Data
Voting Behavior
• N is the number of parties
• s is the vote or poll share (%) of the 
total electorate each party receives.
• Measures the poll vote concentration 
across the electorate
• Used to show changes in 
concentration
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Methodology
• Our research utilized experimental human subject based testing via 
researcher engineered computer software in laboratories. 
• Participants were randomly drawn from an experimental economic 
database of Chapman University, Orange, CA undergraduates
• Participants were controlled for major, gender and academic year.
• 12 Participants polled and voted in 24 Elections, each with randomly 
generated monetarily induced party preferences
• Subjects were paid directly in cash at 1 experimental dollar to 1 USD. 
The were given an endowment of $7 to $17. The mean payout was 
around $15 for a 30 minute experiment.
• Elections consists of 2 stages: a Poll Stage and a Vote stage
• Poll Stage: participants are shown their preferences and poll for their 
party of choice based only on their party payoffs. The polls are turned 
into a bar chart
• Vote Stage: voters can see the results of the poll and can vote. 
Payoffs are assigned by the monetary preference of each voter 
corresponding to the party with the most votes.
• Election sizes used: 12 voter elections, 600 voter elections and 
220,000 voter elections. Each simulation aided experiment had three 
groups each corresponding to one of the election sizes.
• Simulated Voters had sophisticated human-approximating behavior 
based on data gathered from experiments using only human subjects
Simulated Voter Behavior
• Simulated Voter Behavior aims to be human-like not necessarily optimal, 
the goal is to have the human voters behave as similarly as possible to how 
they would behave all voters were human subjects
• Data was gathered from elections with all human subject participants and 
used to create Markov chain decision matrices linking simulated voter’s to 
participants by conditioning polls on previous polls and votes on elections 
polls. These made simulated voters appear to “improve” their decisions as 
voting and polling approach the steady state, emulating human learning. 
• Subjects at the end of all experiments were “quizzed” to distinguish between 
human voter and simulated voter decisions. The identification accuracy was 
52% - statistically indistinguishable from random choices
